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not to the tyrannical side of his chief competitors for popularity. One
can only shudder at the prussianized America which might have
emerged from four administrations of Presidents Fisher Ames and
Timothy Pickering if they could have held the White House from
1801 to 1817. Just as surely, Jefferson led in the eighteenth-century
victory of liberty as he and his associates understood liberty. The
reviewer must go along with Benjamin Ginzburg: this victory was a
sound achievement, even if it seemed formal and abstract when applied
to concrete cases. Most of the time Jefferson identified himself with
causes, as Malone wrote, "for which time was fighting." In this he
served as one of our many human filters through which seventeenth-
century whiggish ideas, cloudy as they were, have been partially
clarified and refined from unwanted feudal and regal sediments.
The best evaluation of a folk-hero is not to measure how far short
of perfection he fell, but to decide how far forward he really pushed
the things that matter. If Thomas Jefferson had died on the evening
of July 3, 1776, he would still have achieved a place of high rank.
He left us that flaming editorial we have been trying to live up to
since the 1820's.
— MARSHALL SMELSER
THE SUPREME COURT, POLITICS, AND MODERN SOCIETY*
Mr. Justice Holmes once analogized the subdued grandeur of the
Supreme Court to the "quiet of a storm center," an oblique way of
describing the institution's proximity to the mainstream of American
politics. Indeed the Court's intrinsic political character was under-
scored by Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that in America major
political disputes frequently tend to resolve themselves into judicial
questions. Surely any tribunal vested with power to strike down
federal and state legislation, to nullify executive orders, to resolve
perplexing controversies between the national and state governments
as well as between individual citizens and politically organized society,
will inescapably embroil itself in the fires of American politics.
But the Court is not exclusively a political institution. It is a court
of law, the symbol of justice and the institutional manifestation of
constitutionalism. Thus the Court is both in politics and above poli-
tics; while it is obligated to enforce the decisions of the popularly
elected branch of government it is also obligated to give concrete
meaning to constitutional principles which may conflict with the
former; while frequently the Court must rule in favor of one group
of interests which results in the defeat of an opposing array of interests,
it must also seek justice in terms of values which transcend the special
* Charles S. Hyneman: The Supreme Court on Trial. (New York: Atherton





























































































































292 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
interests of particular litigants; and while the Court cannot stray too
far from the popular consensus, it occasionally reminds the American
public that the passions of the hour will not be permitted to thwart
the principles of limited government. It is this fundamental dualism
of the Court's role which inevitably leads it into controversy and makes
it impossible to fully assuage the apprehensions of all its critics.
So it is that the Supreme Court has been alternately acclaimed
and denounced, its justices praised and maligned. Indeed a major part
of the history of the Court is a story of its conflicts with the President,
the Congress, the states, or powerful interest groups. But the shock
waves released by the Court's recent decisions, beginning with the
School Segregation Cases of 1954, have reverberated with an intensity
that would compare favorably with the popular outcry which followed
the decision in the Dred Scott Case a. century earlier. The net effect
of many of these decisions has been the expansion of the meaning of
minority rights and individual liberty, usually at the expense of the
states.
Much of the recent criticism levelled at the court has taken the
form of vicious diatribe. Such voices of unreason must not be allowed
to obscure the legitimacy and value of powerful scholarly analyses such
as Charles S. Hyneman's critical inquiry into the modern role of the
Supreme Court in the American political system. The Supreme Court
on Trial, which examines critically the Court's activism in the civil
rights field and re-examines the whole question of judicial review in the
United States, is a book which no serious student of American political
institutions can afford to ignore. The reviewer's disagreement with
many of the author's assumptions is no bar to admitting that he has
done a creditable job in refining some of the issues beneath the current
controversy over the Court.
Hyneman's main argument is that the Supreme Court lifted itself
to a new plateau of judicial power in nullifying the system of legally
sanctioned segregated schools in the South. Thus Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) was unlike any previous exercise of judicial review.
Up to this time the Court's great power .to strike down legislation
hinged primarily on Marbury v. Madison (1803) and the Dred Scott
Case (1857). Hyneman appears to agree with those who view the
Dred Scott Case as an extension or an enlargement of judicial power
and not merely a reaffirmation of the doctrine of judicial review as
expounded in the Marbury case. In the latter, it is alleged, the Court
did not assert its superiority over the political arms of the national
government, but simply refused to enforce a statute conferring a power
upon the Supreme Court which Marshall felt was contrary to the
express language of the Constitution; whereas the Dred Scott Case
represented the first time the Court imposed upon Congress its own
interpretation of the latter's duty under the Constitution. In any
event, until the School Segregation Cases, the one common feature of
all decisions overruling state or federal legislation had the effect of






























































































































ment." But the segregation cases represented a power thrust of an
entirely different order. There the social consequences were quite
severe, for the Court ruled a "way of life unlawful and ordered a
revision of law and governmental practice." Accordingly a "new
constitutional regime," as Hyneman puts it, was instituted.
Whether a new constitutional regime has in fact been instituted
depends upon one's reading of constitutional history. I prefer to read
Brown v. Board of Education alongside of the following factual
observations. First, the Radical Republicans who dominated Congress
after the Civil War erected a structure of law, constitutional and
statutory, designed to eradicate every last vestige of state law recog-
nizing distinctions based on color. Second, the institution of legally
enforced segregation was not finally legitimized until the Supreme
Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, a decision in conflict with
the clear and indisputable intention of the framers of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Finally, the Court has been slowly, almost
imperceptibly, chipping away at the "separate but equal" formula for
many years, at least in the field of education. The Brown case
signaled therefore not a revolution in constitutional theory, but the
culmination of a long line of doctrinal development. In fact it would
be better to argue that the Court in that case was correcting a half
century of error that began with Plessy.
Actually, Hyneman seems more alarmed over the application of
Brown than over the decision itself. He is particularly disturbed by the
fact that the Brown case has been used as precedent to strike down
segregated recreational facilities without an accompanying explana-
tion by the Court of how or why the logic and assumptions of the
former can or should be applied to the latter. In short, the Court does
not appear to have established an adequate doctrinal bridge between
the school and non-school cases. Hyneman says, perhaps correctly,
that "there was no assertion, no dropping of hints, that separation of
the races in other governmentally owned or operated facilities should
also be viewed as inherently unequal and ipso facto forbidden by the
Constitution."
The failure of the Court to circumscribe its powers in this im-
portant area of public policy, notes Hyneman, could lead to a bid for
unrestrained judicial power reminiscent of the pre-1937 Court. Still
another disquieting feature of the new regime is the intensity of the
resistance to the School Segregation Cases, exacerbated by such
equally explosive decisions as Baker v. Carr, on the part of a large
sector of the American public generating not respect but disobedience
of law. These and related decisions are self-defeating since they tend
to diminish public confidence in the authority of the Supreme Court.
But they are also damaging to the democratic process. Deeply
committed to the view that the survival of this democracy depends
upon the capacity of its people through elected representatives to order
public policy, Hyneman fears that an activist Court, by nudging the





























































































































294 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
mine majority rule and blunt the public's sense of political responsi-
bility. He indicates that those who press for greater judicial activism
are in effect recommending: 1) that the Supreme Court save the
nation from the failures of Congress; 2) that the Supreme Court police
the democratic process; and 3) that the Court "be bolder in identify-
ing ideals and setting public officials in pursuit of those ideals." With
each of these recommendations Hyneman finds certain practical and
logical difficulties not the least of which is that the Court inherently
is no more capable of settling constitutional issues involving great
questions of public policy than is Congress. After all, the Court is as
subject to whim and caprice as is Congress while justices are as
susceptible to the infirmities of human judgment as any other public
officials.
To support this view Hyneman briefly examines the history of the
Court's use of key constitutional provisions (for example, general
welfare, interstate commerce, necessary and proper, due process of law)
to illustrate the jagged and circuitous route these provisions have taken
in the Court's effort to impose meaning upon phrases clothed at best
in ambiguity. He notes how the justices, through judicial legerdemain
and adroit use of sundry conceptual devices, have been able to embody
their policy preferences in major constitutional provisions. And be-
cause the justices continue to read their personal preferences into the
Constitution the Supreme Court of the United States is now on trial
"by due process of politics."
Much of this book is given over to re-examining the nature of the
authority conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution.
Hyneman's investigation of the origin and practice of judicial review
is principally intended to show that men may reasonably doubt that
the "power of judges to nullify statutes was vested in them by the con-
stitution." He finds that there is and has always been throughout our
nation "a significant social doubt" that the Supreme Court can disallow
acts of Congress, a doubt reinforced by the superficiality of Marshall's
reasoning in Marbury v. Madison and the fact that his opinion in that
case had the effect of limiting the power of the judiciary and not that
of Congress.
Whatever may have been the quality of Marshall's reasoning Hyne-
man's interpretation of the Marbury case is so narrow as to strip it of
the larger significance it has had in the history of our constitutional
law. If Marshall did not say in so many words that the Supreme Court
was superior to the other branches of government in determining the
legitimacy of the latter's responsibilities under the Constitution, certain-
ly the entire temper and tone of the decision pointed to the doctrine of
judicial supremacy. Marbury v. Madison constitutes an organic link
in a long line of decisions and practices establishing the Supreme
Court's position as final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning as against
the states or the political branches of the national government. In any
case, one wonders about the relevance of this lengthy rehashing of the






























































































































troversial decisions of the last decade which have so upset Hyneman
have not involved the nullification of congressional legislation; indeed,
the Court has deliberately refrained from reaching constitutional issues
in cases under federal law by giving every benefit of constitutional
doubt to the popularly elected branch. This is one reason it is unfair
to compare the Warren Court with the pre-1937 Court which knocked
down one federal statute after another; and if one attacks the Court
for making policy by dint of statutory interpretation he attacks the
Court for something it cannot possibly avoid doing.
The fact is that the "new constitutional regime" has been instituted
by cases nullifying state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But Hyneman seems to feel that the states' rights position is tenable
not only because there is ample precedent in American history for state
resistance to the exercise of federal authority but also because of linger-
ing doubt, particularly in the South, that the Supreme Court was ever
given the power to speak ex cathedra about state responsibility under
the Amendment. Indeed, the express language of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not even settle the question of which government,
state or federal, shall have the last word in defining its meaning. At
least these are some of the considerations which the author thinks
ought to modulate the Court's decisions in those areas where long-
standing state policies embedded in the culture and mores of the people
are being reviewed.
This is by far the weakest part of the entire argument and is wholly
unconvincing. The fact that a substantial minority believes the Court
to be without power to do a certain thing is no real argument against
the Court doing it when our law and tradition have ratified that power.
But more, the Fourteenth Amendment was a blueprint for an equali-
tarian society; it was clearly intended to nationalize certain basic rights
and with that to prohibit classifications based on color. It represented,
as John P. Roche put it, "the gravestone of Madisonian federalism."
The further suggestion that the Amendment does not settle the ques-
tion of which government may define its meaning may be theoretically
compelling but sheer folly if accepted as a practical guide to action;
no state can be allowed to define the outer limits of its power under
the Constitution if we are to abide with the principle of federal su-
premacy. Indeed, the necessity for uniform application of the Con-
stitution implies the primacy of federal interpretation. And at the
federal level the duty of defining rights claimed under the Fourteenth
Amendment has fallen, by default as much as design, to the Supreme
Court which is under no obligation to conform its opinions to the value
structure of any particular group.
It should be recalled that Hyneman questions the propriety, not
the legality, of the School Segregation Cases; for it was somehow
undemocratic for the judiciary to intrude itself into the field of edu-
cational policy in contravention of local law and custom. Stating the
issue in this way, however, sheds more darkness than light. For one





























































































































296 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
it is charged, the Court has blatantly intruded? To define the content
of education or to tell the state the standards it must adopt in evaluat-
ing an educational program would be such an intrusion. But in the
desegregation decision the Court simply held that when a state under-
takes to provide for a compulsory system of education it shall do so
under conditions of strict equality. In view of the evidence all about
us pointing to the manifest injustice of segregated educational facilities
the Court, in deciding the above, simply did what it felt it had to do
in the application of the Equal Protection Clause. This is not to
suggest that the Court should reach out to right every wrong and
correct every injustice that afflicts the nation. (I say this because
Hyneman seems intent in putting this albatross around the necks of
those willing to rise to the defense of the Brown case.) Rather, this is
to suggest that when a gross injustice is perpetuated by state laws which
constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary denial of equality under law
then it is the Court's right and duty to correct the situation when an
appropriate case ripe for decision comes before it.
Similarly what does Hyneman mean in labeling an action "un-
democratic"? Apparently a democratic decision is one made by the
political organs of government and since the Supreme Court is a non-
political institution the judicial process lies outside the vortex of
democratic decision-making. To postulate such a neat antinomy is
to set up a straw man that is easily knocked down. A lot depends
on how one frames the question. The problem in the School Segrega-
tion Cases is not that of the Court pitting a superior will against the
will of the majority in order to bring about a higher morality and a
better society. Indeed, this would be a variant of benevolent despot-
ism. Rather, the problem has been at least in part the almost total
inability of a congressional majority to express itself on this issue
because of anachronistic rules of procedure, seniority, filibusters, and
other anti-majoritarian devices which have frequently enfeebled the
national legislative process. Roche offers the further suggestion that
the Court's invasion of this policy battleground was born of necessity
because of "the inability of our party system to supply a unified package
of leadership and policy which leaves whole sectors of national life
in a contested no-man's land." This, by the way, is still another
reason why it is unfair to analogize the current Court to the pre-1937
court which acted in unashamed defiance of majority will.
Public response to the School Segregation Cases has involved wide-
spread approval and conformed generally to the value structure
implicit in the American consensus, notwithstanding the intensity of
the Southern protest. Even there much, if not most of the criticism
has come from the most irresponsible and abrasive sector of the South-
ern community. Indeed for the Court to have decided otherwise would
have been to pass the mantle of leadership to the most regressive and
backward part of the nation.
The American Negro is restless and impatient with a political






























































































































second-class citizenship. A minority as large and potentially explosive
as the Negro population must somewhere along the line have effective
access to the decisional apparatus of government; the very stability of
a democratic regime would seem to depend upon it. One reason the
American Negro may not have resorted to violence in recent years is
because he has been able to vindicate his birthright and redress in-
justice by legal means in the only forum where that has been possible,
the Supreme Court. Encouraged by the segregation cases the Negro
has gained the confidence to press ahead for all his rights under the
Constitution. And who will gainsay that the political system is better
off because of the Negro's increasing awareness of his potential for
citizenship. Looked at in the context of the entire contemporary
political situation it cannot be said that the segregation cases are in-
compatible with the democratic way of doing things.
Hyneman's rejoinder is that the Supreme Court does not exist to
correct the failures of the representative branches of government. The
Supreme Court, possessing the power neither of the purse nor of the
sword, cannot effectively correct any failure of the elected branches.
He correctly notes that the more perplexing problem is whether the
Court is in a better position than the elected branches to determine
whether there has been a political failure. Though an interesting ques-
tion it is quite meaningless to discuss this as an abstract matter. When
dealing specifically with Brown v. Board of Education the conclusion is
nearly inescapable that there has been a gross political failure where
the treatment of the Negro in the field of education is concerned.
For the resolution of the racial conflict in America there must in the
final analysis be a collaboration of the legislative and executive arms
of the federal government. All the Supreme Court has done is to say
what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids; doubtless the Court has
taken the lead in defining the necessities of the Equal Protection
Clause, but this does not necessarily imply, as the author suggests, a
lack of confidence in the political process as a way of realizing our
ideals.
This book has not convinced me that Brown v. Board of Education
and the subsequent application of that decision raised the Supreme
Court to a new plateau of power; nor am I particularly worried about
the implications of that case as to the future course of judicial decision-
making. The alleged failure of the Court to circumscribe its power
leads the thoughtful man to wonder, says the author, whether the new
regime will be confined to questions of racial segregation. For example,
he sees nothing in the logic of recent decisions which would prevent the
court from reviewing the constitutionality of an allocation of public
funds where it is shown that Negro populated areas have not been
equitably treated in the repair and maintenance of city streets. I
suppose it is possible to conjure up in our minds a whole list of fright-
ful possibilities that might conceivably and logically flow from a certain
line of decisions, but the thoughtful man who views the court in





























































































































298 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
thing is possible—are more imaginary than real and that the court
functions with a sense of judicial propriety even in an era of activism
on the bench.
Nor is there any reason why the frontiers of judicial power must be
rigidly defined just as there is no real reason why a body of constitu-
tional law should yield the high level of predictability that Hyneman
desires. The greatness of our legal tradition is that law deals with
particular situations as they arise in unique and varying circumstances
and in the context of a complex system of political decision-making, a
condition hardly conducive to the formulation of legal exactitudes. A
pragmatic society confronts its great socio-legal problems as they
compel men's attention and then are resolved in accordance with
experience and necessity, not with logic or abstract constitutional
theory; in this tradition experience dictates legal theory, not the reverse.
It is also worth recalling that the lawmaking roles of judiciary, legisla-
ture, executive, and administrative agency change from era to era; the
pattern of interplay between them alters, sometimes drastically depend-
ing upon the intensity and course of social change, human inertia, and
a multitude of other socio-political factors. Whether the court occa-
sionally takes the lead in conflict resolution or whether the behavior
of the court conforms to some rigid standard of judicial propriety is
quite irrelevant so long as the integrity of the entire political system
is maintained. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an activist Court
can seriously affect the balance that obtains between American political
institutions, since the court functions within a complex web of govern-
ment whose character is determined far more by the multifarious pres-
sures brought against it than any pronunciamento of a single organ
of law.
Hyneman comes perilously close to suggesting that the relationship
between the Court and elected branch of government should be one
of subordination rather than coordination. The principle of checks
and balances implicit in a government of separated powers is best
served by a condition of creative tension between the three branches.
I submit that this, not a condition of irreconcilable opposition, properly
describes the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress.
As stated before, the Warren Court has not voided any important piece
of federal legislation. Indeed, the Court has given Congress every
opportunity in the world to rethink certain problems, to question old
assumptions, and to clarify abstruse statutory language which may
have impelled the court to limit the applicability of a statute.
The Court has, of course, voided important state policies, but only
as a by-product of its duty to define minimum constitutional standards
that the states must observe. Even here the Court has left room for
creativity, inventiveness, and innovation on the part of state policy-
makers. That is why the School Segregation Cases and Baker v. Carr
were sometimes far less than bold seizures of power by a Court insensi-
tive to the desires of local politicians. In the former the Court did






























































































































sensitivity on this issue, permitted local authorities to work gradual
solutions under the general supervision of the federal courts. In the
reapportionment case the Court neither spelled out criteria for de-
termining the legitimacy of state apportionment laws nor defined the
outer limits of its own authority to redress grievances stemming from
malapportionments; yet the decision has elicited a constructive riposte
as one state after another has begun to re-evaluate the meaning of
representative democracy by enacting rational apportionment laws. No
one would contend that this issue can definitively be resolved by the
courts. Because the Supreme Court is not the best forum in which to
resolve the problem of non-representative government and does not
have the tools or the competence to draw legislative district lines is no
reason why the Court should not review a state apportionment statute
which involves an invasion of a constitutional right. A Supreme Court
decision often marks the beginning, not the end, of political delibera-
tion.
Perhaps one might view the Supreme Court as a great stimulator
of dialogue, a suggestion which Hyneman would consider appalling,
I am sure. Maybe the great significance of decisions like Brown v.
Board of Education, Baker v. Carr, or Engle v. Vitale is not that they
have decided the issues associated with those cases with absolute final-
ity, to bind this and future generations, but that they have furnished
fodder for debate, and have moved enlightened men to reconsider the
nature of this society and this democracy and the goals that we as
twentieth-century men ought to follow. While the Court's judgments
must be respected and obeyed if order is to prevail, still, in a demo-
cratic society, all the great questions which affect its life are open ques-
tions subject to the interminable scrutiny of responsible men.
— DONALD P. KOMMERS
THE CHALLENGE OF POPE JOHN XXIII*
The era of Pope John XXIII has come and gone. In four brief
years the spiritual simplicity of this wise and generous leader has
changed the world. Some who saw the first session of the Second Vati-
can Council, especially the participation of the cardinals and bishops
from Asia and Africa, predicted that the Catholic Church would never
be the same again. But the calling of the Council was only one of
Pope John's tremendous acts which continue to move and reform the
• 1 . Joseph N. Moody and Justus George Lawler, eds. The Challenge of
Mater et Magistra. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963. Pp. vii, 279. $4.95.)
2. John L. McKenzie, S.J., Myths and Realities: Studies in Biblical The-
ology. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company. Pp. xvi, 285. $4.75.)
3. James J. Hennesey, The First Council of the Vatican: The American
Experience. (New York: Herder and Herder. Pp. 341. $6.50.)
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